The different national tank doctrines of the United States and Imperial Japan resulted in a terrible mismatch of the predominant tank types in the crucial Central Pacific campaign. A flawed Japanese doctrine emphasized light infantry support tanks, often used in small numbers. Tactically, tanks were often frittered away in armored versions of the familiar banzai attacks. Meanwhile, the Americans saw the tank as an infantry support weapon, but developed a more systematic tactical doctrine. They settled upon a larger medium tank - in the case of most Marine Corps tank battalions, the diesel-powered M4A2 (unwanted by the US Army).
This superbly detailed title reveals how both the two sides' tactical and technical differences in the approach to armored warfare soon became apparent over a series of deadly engagements, from the first tank fight at the battle of Tarawa in November 1943, through to engagements on Parry Island, Saipan, and Guam, before ending with Peleliu in September 1944.
Studies of air combat in the Vietnam War inevitably focus on the MiG-killing fighter engagements, B-52 onslaughts or tactical strikes on the Hanoi region. However, underlying all these was the secretive 'electron war' in which highly-skilled electronic warfare officers duelled with Soviet and North Vietnamese radar operators in the attempt to enable US strike forces to reach their targets with minimal losses. Orbiting at the edge of heavily-defended territory, the vulnerable EB-66s identified and jammed the enemy's radar frequencies with electronic emissions and chaff to protect the American bombers. Their hazardous missions resulted in six combat losses, four of them to SA-2 missiles and one to a MiG-21, and they became prime targets for North Vietnamese defences when their importance was realised.
This illustrated study focuses on the oft-overlooked B-66 series, examining their vital contributions to the Vietnam War and the bravery of those who operated them in some of the most challenging situations imaginable. Author Peter E. Davies also explores how the technology and tactics devised during the period made possible the development of the EF-111A Raven, an invaluable component of the Desert Storm combat scenario over Iraq and Kuwait in 1991, and the US Navy's EA-6B Prowler, which entered service towards the end of the Vietnam War.
Between June 1812 and January 1815, US and British forces, notably the regular infantrymen of both sides (including the Canadian Fencibles Regiment), fought one another on a host of North American battlefields. This study examines the evolving role and combat performance of the two sides' regulars during the conflict, with particular reference to three revealing battles in successive years: Queenston Heights, Crysler's Farm, and Chippawa.
Featuring full-color artwork and battle maps, this fully illustrated study investigates the US and British regular infantry's role, tactics, junior leadership, and combat performance on three battlefields of the War of 1812. The actions assessed here notably demonstrate the evolution of US regulars from their initial poor showing to an emerging professionalism that allowed them to face their British opponents on equal terms.
Beating its biplane rivals in a 1936 Reich Air Ministry design competition, the Arado Ar 196 provided the Kriegsmarine with possibly the best shipborne reconnaissance seaplane of World War II. Replacing the Heinkel He 60 biplane as the standard catapult-launched floatplane embarked on the Kriegsmarine's capital ships, the Ar 196 flew an assortment of combat missions during World War II, including coastal patrol, submarine hunting, light bombing, general reconnaissance and convoy escort sorties. The first vessel to take its Ar 196A-1s to sea was the pocket battleship Graf Spee, which embarked two in the autumn of 1939. The battleships Bismarck and Tirpitz could carry six Arados each, the battlecruisers Gneisenau and Scharnhorst four and smaller pocket battleships and cruisers two. Shore-based aircraft were also operated from coastal ports on the Channel, Baltic, North Sea and Bay of Biscay coasts, as well as in the Balkans and Mediterranean.
In this title, supported by an excellent selection of photographs and full-colour illustrations, Peter de Jong explores the history of the Arado Ar 196, detailing their development and assessing the combat capabilities of one of the last fighting seaplanes.
During the Seven Years' War (1755-63), a number of independent light-infantry outfits served under British command and dedicated light companies were added to the British Army's regular infantry battalions. The light companies were disbanded after the war but the prominent role played by light infantry was not forgotten, and in 1771-72 light-infantry companies were reinstated in every regiment in the British Isles.
Although William Howe formed a training camp at Salisbury in 1774 specifically to practise light-infantry doctrine, the outbreak of the American Revolution in 1775 found the British Army wanting, and the light companies were no different. After evacuating Boston in March 1776, Howe began to remodel and drill his army at Halifax, standardizing lighter uniform and emphasizing more open-order tactics. He also brigaded his light companies together into composite battalions, which went on to fight in almost every major engagement during the American Revolution. They spearheaded British assaults, using night-time surprise and relying upon the bayonet in engagements such as Paoli and Old Tappan. They also matched their regular and irregular opponents in bush-fighting, and at times fought in far-flung detachments alongside Native American and Loyalist allies on the frontier. Featuring specially commissioned full-colour artwork, this book offers a comprehensive guide to the formation, uniform, equipment, doctrines and tactics of these elite light infantry companies and battalions, and considers how, over the course of the war they developed a fearsome reputation, and exemplified the psychological characteristics exhibited by crack military units across history.